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Today malaria kills approximately one million people a year,
mostly children, and sickens hundreds of millions more.' This trag-
edy is most pronounced among the poor in underdeveloped countries
with warm climates, where mosquitoes breed readily and there are
few resources to combat the problem. There is presently no vaccine
for malaria,2 only costly treatments to reduce the effects that most of
malaria's victims cannot afford. These deaths and illnesses are al-
most entirely preventable through an inexpensive generic chemical
which, when used properly, has almost no environmental side ef-
fects.
Spraying this chemical on the walls of residences in Africa, Asia,
and Latin America can inexpensively and effectively control the
spread of disease-bearing mosquitoes and some other insects. Used
in this manner, the evidence from decades of use is that the chemical
has no ill effects on humans and minor impacts on the environment,
except on disease-carrying insects. Applied once every six months,
1. Amir Attaran, Donald R. Roberts, Chris F. Curtis, & Wences-
laus L. Kilama, Balancing Risks on the Backs of the Poor, 6 NATURE
Med. 729 (2000) [hereinafter ATTARAN, ROBERTS, CURTIS &
KILAMA].
2. There are drugs that can be taken to avoid getting malaria. The
most common of these, Lariam, is now reported to have serious psy-
chological side-effects, including suicide. See Vanessa Fuhrmans,
Malaria-Drug Maker to Warn of Suicide Risk, WALL ST. J. at DI
(Sept. 4, 2002). Attempts to develop a vaccine have produced one
that is only 90% effective; "the incomplete protection raises fears
that any vaccination program could cause the pathogen to mutate
into a more lethal form." Victoria Griffith, Studies Reveal Difficulty
in Controlling Malaria, F. TIMES at 7 (July 19, 2002). (Scientists
believe malaria "is so complex that a single vaccine is unlikely to
eradicate the infection.").
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the mosquito problem is greatly reduced. Millions of lives can be
saved and hundreds of millions could suffer less. Unfortunately, the
chemical is DDT.3
The use or manufacture of DDT is banned in most countries to-
day.4 Led by environmental groups, an organized effort is underway
to eliminate the last few countries that allow its manufacture and
use.5 The loss of this potent and inexpensive tool in the fight against
malaria and other insect bome illnesses will cost millions of lives
throughout the developing world.
How we came to the current state of affairs - allowing millions,
including millions of children, to suffer and die because of a ban on
a pesticide that would solve a pressing health problem at low cost -
is a story that goes back many years. This state of affairs has its ori-
gin in a history of abuse of pesticides. That abuse was caused in
large part by the refusal of the U.S. federal and state governments to
respect property rights. Had governments been held to the same
standard of care for the rights of citizens that citizens are required by
the common law to have for each other, the destructive policies of
the past would have been avoided and the tragedy of the increase in
malaria today would be unlikely to exist. In short, respect for prop-
erty rights would have encouraged more responsible use of pesti-
cides and avoided many of the problems that resulted from their
overuse.
The lesson of DDT's rise and fall is that property rights play a
critical role in checking public policy abuses. Respect for property
rights requires public actors to obtain property owners' consent be-
3. The full chemical name for DDT is dichlorodiphenyltrichloro-
ethane.
4. See International POPS Elimination Network, DDT & Ma-
laria: Answers to Common Questions, available at
http://www.ipen.org/DDTenglish.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2002)
(noting that according to the U.N. only 19 countries are currently
using DDT to fight malaria and that only six are "recent" users)
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL POPS ELIMINATION NETWORK].
5. See, e.g., World Wildlife Federation, WWF's Efforts to Phase
Out DDT, available at
http://www.worldwildlife.org/toxics/progareas/pop/ddt.htm (last vis-
ited Sept. 5, 2002) ("WWF has been involved in a special effort to
inform, educate, and convince the public and policymakers about the
dangers of DDT and the need to phase out and ban its use.")
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fore they take actions (e.g. pesticide spraying) that affect the prop-
erty owners. When property rights are respected, spillover impacts
are minimized. Public policies imposed without consent, even if
done with good intentions, may produce bad effects. Those effects
may result in the policy being rightly abandoned, but may also spur
other policies that produce more bad effects. Only by consistent re-
spect for property rights, by both governments and private parties,
can we hope to avoid environmental and human catastrophes in the
future.
In Part I of this Article, we briefly describe the use of pesticides
during the twentieth century, emphasizing the government's mass-
spraying programs of the 1950s and 1960s that prompted the current
federal regulatory framework. In Part II we describe the problem of
malaria control today, show how pesticides including DDT have an
important role to play in alleviating human misery and saving lives,
and explore why environmental organizations are preventing devel-
opment of a rational malaria control policy. In Part III we outline
how the common law handles pesticide problems and how an envi-
ronmental law built around the common law could address pesticide
issues today. Part IV concludes the article with a discussion of the
costs of the command-and-control regulatory framework for pesti-
cides and the alternative of a common law-property rights approach
to pesticide problems.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PESTICIDE USE IN THE UNITED STATES
Pesticide use and regulation in the United States has had four dis-
tinct periods in which the pesticides used, public opinion toward pes-
ticides, and regulatory policies applied to pesticides have varied. In
this section we describe each of these periods.
A. The Pre-Modern Era
At the beginning of the twentieth century, pests - not pesticides -
were seen as the more serious threat to human health and well-
being.6 This was true despite the acutely toxic nature of many early
6. The same phenomenon has been at work elsewhere. In the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, governments expended
considerable resources to eradicate predators and drain wetlands. In
the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, even larger
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pesticides, which were often based on inorganic compounds such as
lead and arsenic.7 Indeed, among the efforts at government regula-
tion of pesticide use were state laws, such as one enacted by Wash-
ington state to force apple farmers to use more pesticides (generally
arsenic-based products), not fewer.8 Farmers who sprayed saw their
non-spraying neighbors as getting the benefits of the sprayers' ex-
penditures on pest control, while not contributing to pest control
themselves. In economic terms, the non-sprayers were "free riders" -
taking advantage of the efforts of others without contributing. Non-
sprayers thus gained a competitive advantage (lower costs because
they did not have to pay for spraying) over the sprayers. To solve the
so-called free-rider problem, the sprayers turned to their state legisla-
tures to force their non-spraying neighbors to contribute to the com-
mon good of wiping out the pests that threatened all their apple
crops.
The two major problems with early pesticides were acute toxicity
and fraud. Because the active ingredients were highly toxic sub-
stances like arsenic, working with pesticides, or ingesting foods with
pesticide residues, was extremely hazardous. Controversy over pes-
ticide residues was a regular feature of the pre-World War II period. 9
The problem of fraud was almost the mirror image of the acute tox-
icity problem: Products not based on acutely toxic substances often
simply did not work as advertised. Fly-by-night operators could bilk
farmers for substantial sums by selling them products with no ability
to kill pests. Early regulatory efforts, such as the federal Insecticide
Act of 1910, were aimed at removing ineffective products from the
market and avoiding acute poisonings that could result from the pes-
amounts of resources are now being focused on undoing those earlier
efforts.
7. See JOHN WARGO, OUR CHILDREN'S Toxic LEGACY 67 (1996)
("Lead arsenate and calcium arsenate (which was introduced in
1917) were the pesticides most commonly used between 1917 and
1942") [hereinafter WARGO].
8. JAMES WHORTON, BEFORE SILENT SPRING: PESTICIDES AND
PUBLIC HEALTH IN PRE-DDT AMERICA 74 (1974) [hereinafter
WHORTON].
9. See WARGO, supra note 7, at 67-70 (discussing various pre-
War issues over tolerances and residues).
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ticides that were overly effective.' 0 Pesticide legislation thus mir-
rored the regulatory approach taken to patent medicines, where there
were similar concerns, particularly about fraudulent claims of effec-
tiveness. 
11
B. The Honeymoon
World War II brought attention to new pest problems. Soldiers,
fighting under less than sanitary conditions, proved ideal victims for
a variety of pest-borne diseases, including malaria.' 2 Controllinglice, mosquitoes and other disease vectors became a major military
10. Andrew P. Morriss, Pesticides and Environmental Federal-
ism: An Empirical and Qualitative Analysis of§ 24(c) Registrations,
in ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM 137 (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J.
Hill eds., 1997) [hereinafter MORRISS].
11. Jeffrey E. Shuren, The Modern Regulatory Administrative
State: A Response To Changing Circumstances, 38 HARV. J. on
LEGIS. 291, 300 (2001) ("To a large degree, the [Pure Food and
Drug Act of 1906] focused on preventing economic fraud rather than
protecting the public from deleterious drugs").
12. Wargo describes how wartime conditions favor malaria
transmission:
"Troops live outdoors and are therefore easy targets for
mosquitoes; once they move into malarious regions, dis-
ease incidence and severity among soldiers is normally
high due to lack of immunity; troops are concentrated,
which makes transmission more likely; and combatants
are generally weakened by fatigue, poor nutrition, and
poor sanitation. In addition, military objectives normally
include control over ports, rivers, and water supplies,
which are the primary habitats of mosquitoes. Troop
movement itself can exacerbate the spread of the disease
by inadvertently carrying the parasite into regions previ-
ously malaria-free. Military tactics such as widespread
shelling, bombing, and, more recently, herbicide-induced
defoliation all increase standing water, the preferred
breeding site for mosquitoes."
WARGO, supra note 7, at 30.
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concern. 3 Small wonder then that DDT's discovery was hailed as a
modem miracle. Nontoxic to humans, more effective than the alter-
natives, and cheap and easy to apply, DDT was an important public
health advance. It was first used late in World War II when, sprayed
on soldiers and civilians, it killed body lice, thereby stopping a ty-
phus epidemic in Italy.' 4 Spraying DDT from the air on islands in
the Pacific relieved the troops of the many miseries, especially ma-
laria, caused by mosquitoes. Moreover, DDT was not only more ef-
fective against pests, it was much safer than the inorganic pesticides
it replaced. Seen as generally harmless for humans, DDT's release to
civilian use on August 31, 194515 was hailed as a boon and its pro-
duction rose rapidly. "It is hard to overestimate the impact that
DDT's early success had on the world of public health."' 16 Its inven-
tor, Paul Miller, was awarded the Nobel prize in medicine. DDT
became so popular it was even thrown in place of rice at some wed-
dings. 17 Other new chemicals joined DDT in the marketplace as pes-
ticide manufacturers realized the economic gain from solving pest
problems with new types of chemicals.
Cheap and effective on a wide range of pests that inflict misery on
humans, and safer than the alternatives, the use of these new chemi-
cals such as DDT spread rapidly, with pesticide use increasing five-18
fold between 1950 and 1970. As one scholar noted, looking back
on that period, "civilians bought 'bug bombs' to destroy insects in
their homes and gardens, while trucks and airplanes sprayed clouds
of the inexpensive insecticide over fields and neighborhoods, often
using far more than recommended and carelessly engulfing animals
13. The development of DDT and its initial military uses are well
described in Malcolm Gladwell, The Mosquito Killer, THE NEW
YORKER 42, 42-44 (July 2, 2001) [hereinafter GLADWELL].
14. THOMAS R. DUNLAP, DDT: SCIENTISTS, CITIZENS, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 61-63 (1981) [hereinafter DUNLAP].
15. Holly Lippke, DDT: An Overview (unpublished manuscript on
file with authors) [hereinafter LIPPKE].
16. GLADWELL, supra note 13, at 44.
17. WHORTON, supra note 8, at 248.
18. WILLIAM ROGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 399 (2 ed. 1994)
[hereinafter ROGERS].
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and people. Most of us didn't care then."' 9 Agricultural use of pesti-
cides also soared. Insect pests were a major threat to crops, with the
average annual loss from pests and disease estimated at $360 million
in 1945.20
The pre-World War II free-rider problem remained, however. Not
everyone could afford, or wanted to use, chemical means of pest
control. Control of pests presented a classic "public good" problem:
no single landowner or group of landowners could control all the
pests in an area. If any failed to act, and act in a coordinated fashion,
the pest would escape being eliminated and reinfest the pest-free
areas. The obvious solution was public provision of a variety of pest
control services, enabling efficient, coordinated coverage of large
areas. Government agricultural agents taught farmers the virtues of
pest control. Government programs applied pesticides to control
pests. Government scientists worked to discover new means of using
pesticides to make agriculture more productive.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture in particular promoted wide-
spread spraying of DDT and many other pesticides throughout the
1950s and into the 1960s. To give just one example, DDT produc-
tion grew from 38 million pounds in 1953 to 125 million pounds in
1959. 2 1 Pesticide operations under USDA control grew rapidly with
bipartisan support in Congress. As a member of the House agricul-
ture committee said, "We expect the Department of Agriculture, in
cooperation with the land grant colleges and experiment stations and
... with insecticides producers and the chemical industry, to develop
pesticides that will control what is left of the immune insects that
attack what we produce and present to the American consumer."22
Enthusiasm was, if anything, even greater in the Senate, where Sena-
tor Allen Ellender said, in 1953, that pesticide use would help agri-
culture, thereby improving national security and helping to defeat
communism.23
19. Allan Manzur, Why Do We Wony About Trace Poisons?, 7
RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV'T 35, 35 (1996) [hereinafter
MANZUR].
20. CHRISTOPHER J. Bosso, PESTICIDES AND POLITICS: THE LIFE
CYCLE OF A PUBLIC ISSUE 28 (1987) [hereinafter BOSSO].
21. Id., at 31; DUNLAP, supra note 14, at 254.
22. BOSSO, supra note 20, at 69.
23. Id.
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Pesticide regulation also changed after World War II. In 1947 the
federal government began to take a more significant role, largely in
response to pesticide manufacturers' concerns over the impact of
increasing state regulation. 24 With the development of new forms of
pesticides, based on the war-time discoveries of the pesticidal prop-
erties of chemicals like DDT, the pesticide market was changing.
Whereas the pre-DDT pesticide market had had multiple formula-
tions of a few active ingredients, with a significant role for local
manufacturers, the pesticide market was now becoming increasingly
national as companies with expertise in the type of research and de-
velopment efforts necessary to discover and produce these new
products increased their position in the field. Faced with potentially
expensive compliance with inconsistent state requirements (e.g. the
requirement that the label list a state's registration information), the
industry successfully lobbied for a federal role. The result was the
1947 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
("FIFRA").25
This statute was built around the same efficacy and acute health
concerns as the earlier state and federal regulation, 26 it did not give
USDA any significant regulatory powers. For example, the statute
gave USDA only weak powers to require manufacturers to submit
proof of efficacy to the agency and required manufacturers to regis-
ter their products with the agency. At the same time, it denied the
USDA the ability to refuse to register a product.27 Manufacturers
thus had the best of all possible worlds - no significant limitation on
their ability to manufacture and sell effective pesticides, limits on
illegitimate competitors' ability to sell ineffective products, preemp-
tion of state regulation in some areas, and federal regulatory author-
ity located in a sympathetic agency whose primary mission was to
assist farmers, not to regulate chemical use.
The pesticide manufacturers, users, and regulators formed yet an-
other example of the enduring "iron triangle" of politicians, bureau-
crats, and special interests in Washington. 28 The USDA and mem-
bers of Congress gained political credit by using tax dollars to subsi-
dize agricultural production through promotion of chemical use,
24. See MORRISS, supra note 10, at 139.
25. 61 Stat. 163 (1947).
26. See ROGERS, supra note 18, at 415.
27. MORMSS, supra note 10, at 139.
28. BOSSO, supra note 20, at 11.
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while simultaneously pleasing the makers of assorted chemicals.
While we can look back skeptically upon their behavior now, there is
no doubt that the sense of mission in promoting agriculture through
pesticide use was sincere and made the special interests' work easier
by giving a public interest rationale for the programs they sought.29
DDT and other new pesticides were cheap solutions to the boll wee-
vil and other scourges that blighted agriculture. Promoting their use
would result in greater agricultural productivity, benefiting farmers,
consumers and the national interest.
From the vantage point of the 1950s, promotion of DDT and other
pesticides was no different economically than most other govern-
ment programs. An important role for government, economists
taught, was the subsidization of "public goods," those goods for
which no one person could capture all the economic benefits of pro-
viding. 30 If Farmer Jones sprayed his fields for a pest, so the thinking
went, he saved Farmer Smith next door some money, since fewer
hungry bugs would live to migrate from Jones' farm to Smith's farm
in search of food. Since Smith would not be likely to pay Jones for
the reduction in pests on Smith's farm brought about by Jones'
spraying, Jones would not spray "enough." The result: "too many"
pests and "too little" pesticide use. To get to the "efficient" level of
spraying therefore required either forcing Smith to spray (the ap-
proach taken by Washington state with apple growers in the early
1900s) or subsidizing Jones via general treasury funds granted to the
29. Such coalitions between "bootleggers" and "Baptists" are an
important part of the political debate. Much as actual bootleggers
ally with actual Baptists to lobby for liquor control statutes - benefit-
ing the bootleggers by reducing their legitimate competition and the
Baptists by restricting the availability of liquor - other interest
groups find it useful to ally with an ideological or moral cause to
promote policies in their self-interest. See Bruce Yandle, Bootleg-
gers and Baptists: The Education of a Regulatory Economist, REG.,
May/June 1983, at 12. See also Bruce Yandle & Stuart Buck, Boot-
leggers, Baptists, and the Global Warming Battle, 26 HARV. ENvTL.
L. REv. 177 (2002) (applying theory to explain global warming de-
bate).
30. See R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW 188-
191 (1988) (discussing economic literature's use of public goods
arguments). The same rationale continues to be used today to justify
programs such as national parks and highways.
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USDA. As public choice theory has pointed out, subsidies are the
politically more attractive option relative to taxes or other means of
coercion, since the recipient is pleased to receive the subsidy and the
taxpayers who fund the subsidy are rarely aware of the costs of the
program, since it is spread over millions of taxpayers. 3'
The USDA took several approaches to promoting pesticide use.
First, the USDA sprayed some acreage itself, including public lands.
These USDA pesticide spray programs expanded significantly in the
1950s: 32 Millions of acres of trees in the northeast were sprayed with
DDT to kill gypsy moths.33 In 1957, Congress approved the Fire Ant
Eradication Act,34 under which the USDA planned to treat 20 mil-
lion acres (an area the size of South Carolina) with broad spectrum
pesticides, with federal taxpayers bearing half the cost.35 To rational-
ize the program, as Rachel Carson noted in Silent Spring, the USDA
asserted that fire ants were a major threat to agricultural production,
animals, and even human life.
3 6
31. John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority
Rules as a Constitutional Solution, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 365,
380 (1999) ("Due to these advantages, special interest groups often
secure disproportionate benefits. The power of a special interest
group may enable it to persuade a majority of the legislature to sup-
port its legislation, even though a majority of voters would not sup-
port the legislation if those voters considered the issue. Observations
confirm that politicians often favor legislative programs that provide
concentrated benefits to a small group and diffuse their costs over
the public at large") [hereinafter McGrNNIs & RAPPAPORT].
32. Bosso, supra note 20, at 81-106 is the basis of the following
discussion.
33. See Andrew Liebhold & Rose-Marie Muzika, Here Come the
Gypsy Moth Brigades, available at
http://www.sandyliebhold.com/innervoice (last visited Sept. 5, 2002)
(recounting history of gypsy moth control efforts).
34. Bosso, supra note 20, at 87 (describing passage).
35. Id. at 87-88.
36. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 162 (1962) ("In 1957 the
United States Department of Agriculture launched one of the most
remarkable publicity campaigns in its history. The fire ant suddenly
became the target of a barrage of government releases, motion pic-
tures, and government-inspired stories portraying it as a despoiler of
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Second, the USDA directly encouraged pesticide use by funding
extension service and experiment station research on pesticides, and
by finding new uses for existing products. At the same time, the
USDA "virtually abandon[ed] all nonchemical control research and
practice" after World War II, due to the success of DDT and the
other new chemicals.37
Third, other USDA policies indirectly encouraged pesticide use.
38
For example, many price support programs operated by limiting
acreage planted of a certain crop while simultaneously supporting
the price. Because farmers were not limited in their ability to use
fertilizer, pesticides and herbicides, they would increase chemical
inputs to maximize output from the acres that were planted. 39 At the
same time, the crop price supports also encouraged farmers to
squeeze more output out of their restricted land by raising the price
the farmers received for their crops. 40 Both aspects of price support
programs thus encouraged increased pesticide use.
By the end of the 1950s, the federal government was providing
numerous incentives for private parties to increase pesticide use,
through direct and indirect, explicit and implicit subsidies. The fed-
eral government was also directly applying massive quantities of
pesticides to both public and private property. Regulation of pesti-
southern agriculture and a killer of birds, livestock, and man") [here-
inafter CARSON].
37. BosSo, supra note 20, at 31.
38. Pesticide use is determined by a wide range of factors, includ-
ing "relative factor prices, price responsiveness, and expected returns
from chemical use, government farm, conservation, and regulatory
policies, technology, and pest resistance." Noel D. Ui, A Note on the
Development and Use of Pesticides, 204 THE SCIENCE OF THE TOTAL
ENVIRONMENT 57, 59 (1997) [hereinafter URI].
39. See, e.g., URI, supra note 38, at 62 ("When planted acreage is
constrained and price expectations include program payments, pro-
ducers tend to substitute non-land inputs, including pesticides, to
boost yields and capture higher returns on their eligible planted acre-
age").
40. See Bosso, supra note 20, at 28-29 (describing farm programs
impact on pesticide demand); John K. Hosemann, Agriculture and
the Environment: A Thirty Year Restrospective in ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY AND AGRICULTURE: CONFLICTS, PROSPECTS & IMPLICATIONS
(Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle eds., forthcoming 2003).
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cide use was minimal, with the federal regulator having relatively
few powers and being primarily concerned with its mission of pro-
moting agriculture.
C. The Rise of Conflict
As pesticide use increased, it spread beyond the early, noncontro-
versial applications to areas where its effectiveness and usefulness
was less clear. Soldiers facing debilitating bouts of malaria while
fighting their way across the South Pacific, for example, probably
would have been happy to see planes spraying DDT even if they had
the chance to read Silent Spring first. Since the book would not be
written for more than a decade, however, all they knew was that the
spray planes brought relief from mosquitoes at no apparent cost to
them. As pesticides became more widely used, however, the uses
expanded and the new uses were less clearly beneficial and the costs
of pesticide use became more apparent. At the same time, increased
use also increased understanding of pesticides' impact on the envi-
ronment, making the costs of use even more apparent. By the end of
the 1950s, government spray programs began to provoke some pub-
lic opposition and both federal and state governments began to re-
strict some of the uses of certain chemicals, including DDT.4 '
One reason for the change was that some of the new applications
caused unintended side effects for non-target species. These effects
often came about because the USDA knew relatively little about the
effects of widespread dispersion of many of the chemicals it pro-
moted and subsidized. This ignorance resulted from the political dy-
namic of public funding for research: Members of Congress receive
political credit for, and so direct funds toward, providing services
such as spraying. Background research needed to understand the
environmental impacts of the programs, on the other hand, earned
legislators little political credit with constituents. 42 Moreover, be-
41. See LIPPKE, supra note 15, at 5 (noting that USDA began to
phase out DDT use in 1958 and that the Secretary of the Interior is-
sued restrictions on DDT use on public lands in 1964).
42. For example, former U.S. Senator William Proximire (D.
Wisc.) regularly awarded "Golden Fleece Awards" to agencies that
he viewed as wasting taxpayer's money. These often included scien-
tific research grants. See, e.g., Taxpayers for Common Sense, The
Golden Fleece Award, available at
14 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LA WJOURNAL
cause federal regulation preempted much state regulation, it had the
effect of discouraging states and localities from attempting to control
pesticide use to limit local environmental impacts. The politics of the
regulatory structure thus discouraged investment in understanding
the impacts of the spray programs and increased chemical use, which
led to overuse. 43 Importantly, when spraying caused harm to private
interests, for example when it harmed wildlife and domestic animals,
the USDA was not required to fully compensate the owners of the
damaged resources 44 and therefore failed to consider the full costs of
the spraying.
Spraying pesticides on a widespread basis to target more marginal
threats began to reveal some of the problems through experience
however, as reports of wildlife and domestic animal deaths surfaced.
For example, after a veterinarian in Georgia reported that over 100
cattle died after one USDA aerial bombardment of Dieldrin, farmers
across the south increasingly refused to pay for spraying. 45 Even in
Alabama, where fire ants had first appeared via the Port of Mobile
and where people were familiar with the problems the ants posed,
the legislature withdrew funding for spraying in 1959, after state
game officials estimated that up to 75 percent of the state's wildlife
could be eliminated by the spraying program.
46
http://www.taxpayer.net/awards/goldenfleece/history.htm (last vis-
ited Sept. 5, 2002) (describing history of award and listing recipi-
ents, including multiple awards for scientific research).
43. Moreover, although it seems obvious now that spraying pesti-
cides over tens of thousands of acres would surely have at least the
potential for significant environmental impacts, it was less obvious
in the 1950s. It is important to keep in mind that bureaucrats, politi-
cians, environmentalists, and chemical companies had far less reason
to suspect that pesticide use was causing problems then than they
would today.
44. Wildlife, for example, is "unowned" and so there is no owner
to seek compensation. Owners of domesticated animals would have
to prove causation to receive compensation. Where the government
sprayers did not comply with rules requiring them to register with
local authorities, this could be difficult. See CARSON, supra note 36,
at 146. Limited scientific knowledge could also make proving harm
difficult as well.
45. Bosso, supra note 20, at 102.
46. Id.
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The USDA's immediate solutions to the drop in public support
were to lower the price of participation by offering the chemicals for
free to those who would take them,47 and simply continuing to spray
in some areas without state or farmer input. A constituency now ex-
isted within the USDA to continue eradication programs even with
lessened public support: the USDA employees whose jobs were to
implement these programs and the USDA officials whose institu-
tional and political prestige were tied to the programs' success. Such
a reaction is the result of well-intentioned individuals pursuing their
conception of the public welfare; there is no need to assume bad mo-
tives for the USDA employees who undoubtedly believed they were
ridding the nation of dangerous pests. The growing opposition took
its toll, however, by reducing the political benefits of supporting di-
rect expenditures on spray programs and the federal spray programs
gradually wound down. Nevertheless, the indirect incentives for in-
creased pesticide use remained, continuing to encourage farmers to
use pesticides.
A second reason for the development of public opposition was
several scares concerning pesticide residues on food. Growers have
long worried about public reaction to negative publicity about food
contaminants.48 One means of addressing the problem was to test
products to certify the absence of harmful amounts of residues. Pro-
ducers of products who conducted testing had an interest in shifting
those costs to the public. For example, Beech-Nut, a baby-food
maker, complained in the early 1950s about the cost it incurred from
47. Id.
48. Because many early pesticides were acutely toxic (arsenic),
residues on foods have been a public concern for many years. In
1891 a scare about a fungicide used on grapes caused lurid headlines
in the New York Times and other papers. Public health authorities
destroyed grapes and consumption dropped as consumers avoided
them. Analysis by the USDA showed that "an adult would have to
eat 300 pounds of grapes a day, including heavily coated stems, to
get a harmful dose." DUNLAP, supra note 14, at 41. The scare went
away, but growers remembered the consequences. When a similar
situation arose in England in 1925, with respect to fruit imported
from the U.S., growers hired independent chemists to inspect their
products and assure the public that the fruit was safe.
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testing for insecticide residues and lobbied for regulations to limit
pesticides in agricultural products.49
A major public scare about residues and improper use of chemicals
came with the cranberry crisis of 1959. In early November 1959 the
Secretary of HEW announced that cranberries were contaminated
with aminotriazole, a USDA registered herbicide, which the FDA
said caused cancer in lab rats. 50 Cranberry sales dropped just before
Thanksgiving, the critical market period, and sales were halted in
some states. The USDA sputtered that there was no real threat; and
both major party presidential candidates Nixon and Kennedy pub-
licly ate cranberries to demonstrate that they were safe, but sales still
collapsed to one-third their normal level.51 The damage to the cran-
berry market eventually passed but the scare left heightened public
awareness that agricultural sprays might not be as beneficial as had
been touted.
Thus, by the end of the 1950s, public opposition towards pesticide
use had appeared. Two events during the 1960s proved critical to
the development of the next phase of pesticide policy. First, the
USDA had an ongoing gypsy moth eradication program in New
York state. When the USDA began the program, millions of acres in
eastern New York, including Long Island, were subject to massive
aerial spraying in the mid-1950s. DDT was mixed with oil, so it
would stick to the trees, and blanketed the area.52 No other effective
control chemical had been discovered and the gypsy moth was a se-
rious problem in eastern forests. The goal of the program was lauda-
tory (saving eastern forests) and the method chosen appeared to be
the only reasonable solution. Even though human health was not at
risk, preserving New York's forests was an important environmental
goal.
Because the USDA mixed the DDT with oil, residents complained
about the scum that coated cars, swimming pools, and houses. Of
even greater concern were reports of large fish kills and charges that
DDT, consumed by cows, would contaminate milk.53 Organic farm-
49. DUNLAP, supra note 14, at 68.
50. BOSSO, supra note 20, at 98.
51. See Bosso, supra note 20, at 98-99.
52. DUNLAP, supra note 14, at 87-91(providing the basis of the
following discussion).
53. See CARSON, supra note 36, at 143-145; BOSSO, supra note
20, at 85.
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ers were angry because after their fields were sprayed, they no
longer had organic crops. In 1957, Robert Cushman Murphy, an au-
thority on birds and curator-emeritus of the Museum of Natural His-
tory, led a group of Long Island residents in filing suit against the
USDA to enjoin the spraying program. Relying on common law
property and tort theories, Dr. Murphy and other plaintiffs charged
that the spraying program deprived them "of property and possibly
lives without due process of law," and took "their private property
for public use without just compensation" and was a "trespass upon
the persons and property of the plaintiffs. 54
Murphy argued that DDT is a poison that can damage humans,
animals, birds, and insects, that it made the food from gardens unsafe
to eat, and that it made land unsuitable for organic cultivation. 55 He
contended that there was no public emergency that could justify the
spraying program, especially since no trees in Long Island were in-
fected with gypsy moths and, even if they were, it would be best to
let nature take its course.
56
In rejecting the residents' request for injunctive relief, the trial
judge reviewed the program, noting that the spray consisted of one
pound of DDT per one gallon of light oil sprayed by aircraft and that
there was no doubt that the spray irritated some people and damaged
some wildlife. 57 Despite this, however, the judge ruled that the sup-
port of public agencies58 for the spray program overrode the plain-
tiffs' property rights. The judge found that "[s]uch a formulation of
informed opinion could not be ignored ... and the research conducted
by the trained staffs of both Federal and New York State depart-
ments was directed to an intelligent pro gam designed to deal with
the realities of a perplexing situation. Furthermore, USDA ex-
perts had testified that there was no evidence of illness caused by
60DDT. Since the public benefit was great and the plaintiffs "failedto show that there was a threat of irreparable damage to them in ex-
54. Murphy v. Benson, 151 F. Supp. 786, 789 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
55. Id. at 789-91.
56. Id. at 789.
57. Id. at 791.
58. In 1955 the National Plant Board, representing all 48 states,
passed a resolution urging the USDA to eradicate the gypsy moth.
Murphy v. Benson, 151 F. Supp. 786, 791 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
59. See id. at 792.
60. See id.
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cess of that which would probably be visited upon the community in
general" from the gypsy moth, the judge refused to enjoin the pro-
61gram.
Murphy was back in federal district court for the trial the following
year, still trying to enjoin the spray program. This time, Murphy
came armed with more evidence of dangers from DDT exposure.62
Again, plaintiffs argued that they had the right to not have their
property sprayed because it destroyed their ability to farm organi-
cally, and it harmed beneficial insects and wildlife. The court re-
jected these arguments because there was testimony that injured
populations of insects were soon replenished and that crops sprayed
with DDT were not unfit to eat,63 ignoring the preference of some
people not to eat such crops. The court again dismissed the plain-
tiffs' claims, holding that they really only complained of "annoy-
ance" rather than damage. 64 The annoyance was offset by a valid
exercise of government police power: "The rights of individuals are
not limitless. Individuals must yield to the requirements of the public
as a whole."
65
We have the benefit of a set of notes of the 1958 trial made by a
Cornell University employee and his description of the trial is help-
ful in understanding why the plaintiffs failed to block the spraying. 66
The plaintiffs' counsel's opening statement noted that the plaintiffs
"are required against their will to have their property and their per-
sons sprayed with this poison dissolved in kerosene." 67 Defense
counsel for both the state of New York and the federal government
then asserted sovereign immunity as a defense. 6 8
The witnesses' testimony is also revealing. The plaintiffs all testi-
fied to direct harm suffered by the spraying. Murphy, for example,
61. See id.
62. Murphy v. Benson, 164 F. Supp. 120 (E.D.N.Y. 1958).
63. See id. at 124-125.
64. See id. at 126.
65. See id. at 128.
66. C.C. Alexander, Notes on DDT Case (1958) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors and the Cornell University Library).
The author, as might be expected for a land grant university em-
ployee, was sympathetic to the spray program and the government's
position [hereinafter ALEXANDER].
67. ALEXANDER, supra note 66, at 1.
68. Id. at 2.
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testified that the spraying eliminated fish he was attempting to raise
in a pond on his property and killed insects and fiddler crabs and that
there were no gypsy moths on his property. 69 A farmer from West-
chester County testified that her spinach crop was burned by the oil
in the spray, birds and fish were killed, and her horses scared. 70 A
commuter testified that she was sprayed while walking to the train
station.71 Another was sprayed in her yard. 2 A farmer lost his entire
ten acre pea crop. 73 Another had moved to the country explicitly to
grow her own food for her family; instead she and her children were
sprayed along with their garden. 4
Despite the plaintiffs' detailed allegations, their experts were chal-
lenged as being out of step with expert opinion. Dr. William Martin,
for example, was "led to admit" on cross-examination "that out of
125,000 physicians in the United States there are only about 600"
who agree with him on DDT's harmful effects. 75 Attempts to get an
expert who indicated that the Public Health Service was a "very
reputable" organization to testify that the PHS could make mistakes
76were stopped by the court. Defense experts, in contrast, testified
that DDT sprays and residues were safe, including a description of
studies in which prisoners were fed DDT daily.7
7
Testimony also established that the type of aerial spraying used
could not be modified to avoid property of individuals who objected,
streams, and ponds.7 8 A USDA employee testified that "it would be
inconvenient and expensive to eradicate gypsy moths by ground
sprays, though not impossible."7 9 The contracts for the aerial spray-
ing were arranged in Washington, not on Long Island.8 °
69. Id.
70. Id. at 3.
71. Id. at 6.
72. Id. at 6.
73. ALEXANDER, supra note 66, at 7.
74. Id. at 11.
75. Id. at 3.
76. Id. at 4.
77. Id. at 10, 11. Prisoners were also used to test anti-malarial
drugs. See WARGO, supra note 7, at 35.
78. ALEXANDER, supra note 66, at 7.
79. Id. Another witness testified that ground spraying cost $25 per
acre compared to $1 per acre for aerial spraying. Id. at 16.
80. ALEXANDER, supra note 66, at 21.
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The defense's own experts, indicated that the threat from gypsy
moths on Long Island also appeared minimal. The Director of the
Plant Pest Control Division of the USDA, for example, testified that
prior to the spraying the "infestation" on Long Island was "light and
scattered." 81 The plaintiffs "hammered on the point" that 600,000
acres were sprayed to deal with forty-seven foci of infestation.82
After the district court rejected their arguments, the plaintiffs in
Murphy appealed, but the Second Circuit Court of Appeals made
short shrift of their argument holding that because the spraying pro-
gram was over, the case was moot. 83 Besides, the court noted, the
plaintiffs failed to prove damages. 84 The Murphy plaintiffs appealed
to the Supreme Court, which denied certiorari. Justice William 0.
Douglas dissented from the denial of certiorari, arguing the issue
was not moot because spraying could resume and because the dam-
age from DDT was not well enough understood for the courts to
dismiss the possibility of danger. 8
5
The trial record gives some insights into why the common law
failed in this case. Despite direct testimony concerning harm, includ-
ing tangible harm to organic crops, the courts rejected the plaintiffs'
claims based on the apparently overwhelming scientific opinion
marshaled by the government. Despite the minimal benefit of the
spray program - which dealt with a "light and scattered" set of fewer
than fifty infestation foci of gypsy moths - the government opted to
spray 600,000 acres at a cost of at least $600,000 by its own esti-
mates at trial. Even using the government's own cost figures for
ground spraying costs, the entire problem could have been avoided if
those forty-seven infestation foci occupied fewer than 24,000
acres. 86 For a "light and scattered" infestation, it seems unlikely that
anything close to 24,000 acres would have been infested. Thus the
government chose, from Washington, to use aerial spraying for rea-
sons of convenience and without regard to the property rights of the
plaintiffs. In addition, the government paid the sprayers by the gal-
lon, not the acre, giving them every incentive to maximize the
81. Id. at 12.
82. Id.
83. Murphy v. Benson, 270 F.2d 419, 420 (2d Cir. 1959).
84. See id.
85. Murphy v. Benson, 362 U.S. 929 (1960).
86. Using the $25 per acre figure, dividing 600,000 acres by 25
yields 24,000 acres.
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amount sprayed. 87 The problem for the common law was thus that
the government was the defendant, not that the legal theories were
lacking.
The economic explanation for the USDA's direct promotion of
pesticide use is straightforward. Politicians in Congress and the
managers at the USDA had an incentive to maximize the net politi-
cal benefits of spraying pesticides. The first spray programs were
conducted where the marginal political benefits of spraying were
largest, such as controlling malaria. As the programs expanded,
spraying was done in areas where the marginal benefits were smaller
(e.g. gypsy moth control). Similarly, the spraying programs were
first done where the marginal political costs of spraying were lowest
(over swamps) and expanded into areas where the marginal political
costs were increased (inhabited areas).
Even if nothing had changed, the political benefits of the spray
programs' expansion would eventually have fallen below the costs
of continuing to expand them, which included the opportunity cost
of foregone alternative uses for the tax money spent on these spray
programs. However, as the public became wary of spray programs
and the programs expanded into areas with lower net benefits, the
total political benefits declined and Congressional and agency sup-
port for them also fell.
In some respects this cycle is not that different from that of the in-
troduction of a product into a new market. New products appear, are
first used where the marginal value of their contribution is highest,
and are gradually introduced to additional uses with lower marginal
benefits until an equilibrium is reached where marginal benefit
equals marginal cost. Political processes differ from markets in sev-
eral important ways that have significant implications for the pesti-
cide regulation story.
First, there is a free-rider problem in organizing to influence the
USDA and Congress. 88 If the benefits of a program are divided
among 100 individuals, for example, but the costs are spread over
100,000,000 taxpayers, the benefit to each individual lobbying for
the program greatly exceeds the cost to each individual taxpayer.
Those in favor of the program will thus have an easier time organiz-
ing to lobby for continuation of the program than those who oppose
87. CARSON, supra note 36, at 146.
88. See McGImNIs & RAPPAPORT, supra note 31, at 378-380 for a
discussion of this issue.
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it. Since Congress could mandate the use of tax dollars to pay for
them, spraying programs were extended beyond what would have
been otherwise done by individual decision makers.
Second, political markets require action by politicians on issues of
public concern. When public concern over pesticide use rose, espe-
cially after the publication of Silent Spring, the USDA and Congress
were suddenly faced with a sharp increase in political demand for
action on pesticides.
89
Third, governments do not face the same costs as private individu-
als. As we discuss below, private individuals who spray chemicals
(or do anything else) that harm the property of another without the
property owners' consent is liable for any damages caused. Had the
government been held to the same standard as private parties were
who engaged in spraying chemicals, as the plaintiffs in the various
suits on Long Island sought to do, the government would have had to
compensate those harmed by the spray programs. That compensation
would have increased the cost of the program, forcing the govern-
ment to consider whether or not the benefits of the program were
justified by the additional costs. Since price increases cause the
quantity demanded to decrease, a relationship that holds even for
most government programs, there would have been less spraying as
a result. But because the government was able to invoke the public
good as a counterweight to those private interests, the government
was not held to those standards and was not forced to make those
choices.
The result of the failure of the attempts to hold the government re-
sponsible for its actions through common law tort and property suits
and the public choice issues described above that promoted con-
tinuation of spray programs and other subsidies for pesticide use was
that the debate over pesticides shifted to the public arena. Those op-
posed to the widespread use of pesticides turned to Congress and
regulation to accomplish what they could not do through the court
system.
89. Lippke summarizes reaction to Silent Spring among the public
as follows: "The general public . . . believed the assertions [about
DDT's dangers] verbatim, and was astounded that the government
could allow such devastation to occur." LIPPKE, supra note 15, at 6.
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D. Environmental Concerns in Regulation & the Ban on DDT
As the disputes over pesticide use grew more heated during the
1960s, those concerned about the issue became increasingly dissatis-
fied with the USDA's performance as a regulator because of its pri-
mary devotion to agricultural promotion, despite the USDA's can-
cellation of many of the DDT products' registrations, including all
uses on fifty food crops.90 The USDA clearly had a bias toward agri-
culture, but its hands were also tied by the substance of FIFRA,
which until 1972 did not include environmental concerns. 91 The pub-
lication of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring in 1962 (serialized in part
in The New Yorker before its publication), marked the turning of the
tide of popular opinion against DDT. The book was well-written,
knowledgably discussed scientific research, and painted a horrifying
picture of the world that was coming if DDT use was not restricted.9
Released with a flood of publicity, including a favorable hour-long
program on CBS and an article by Supreme Court Justice William
0. Douglas in the Book-of-the-Month Club newsletter, the book was
a bestseller. 
93
Carson told her readers of a "silent spring," where no birds would
sing because they would all be dead from DDT exposure. Some of
Carson's assertions about the hazards of DDT were overblown, 94 but
her "primary claim - that pesticides were flagrantly overused, pollut-
ing the environment to a degree that damaged wildlife and possibly
threatened human health - was correct and timely."95 By the late
1950s there was good evidence that DDT, when sprayed over large
areas, could cause fish kills and bird kills, as well as the intended
insect kills. By the 1960s, scientists studying birds were becoming
increasingly convinced that DDT was decimating populations where
it was sprayed widely. Studies of the peregrine falcon and other rap-
90. BOSSO, supra note 20, at 138-139 (summarizing criticisms of
USDA).
91. Bosso, supra note 20, at 154-55.
92. CARSON, supra note 36 (Carson was also a well-respected sci-
ence and nature writer.)
93. MANZUR, supra note 19, at 53.
94. Frederick J. Stare, Some Comments on Silent Spring,
NUTRITION REv. (January 1963) (critiquing the science of Silent
Spring).
95. MANZUR, supra note 19, at 51.
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tors found evidence that DDT caused a thinning of egg shells.
96
Conclusive or not, qualified scientists produced credible studies that
pointed to wildlife problems stemming from extensive government
use of DDT. Carson, however, did not discuss the important role
DDT had played in antimalaria efforts: "Nowhere in 'Silent Spring'
did Carson acknowledge that the chemical she was excoriating as a
menace had, in the two previous decades, been used by malariolo-
gists to save somewhere in the vicinity of ten million lives."
97
The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), at that time a small envi-
ronmental pressure group, went on the offensive in the late 1960s
with high profile law suits and campaigns that brought in a gush of
revenue. 98 Taking advantage of an administrative hearing in Wiscon-
sin, the EDF assisted a local group in getting DDT declared a water
pollutant.99 Public concern about chemicals in food and the envi-
ronment was increasing. The FDA, for example, banned the sweet-
ener cyclamate on thin evidence and was considering, with Congres-
sional support, banning assorted other substances. Pesticides became
a major issue, with the average number of articles on the subject
listed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature growing from
three per year before Silent Spring to more than thirty per year in the
three years following.100 The result was an "awesome" plunge of
DDT in public perception "from miracle pesticide to bird execu-
tioner."'
Trying to stem uninformed public concerns about health hazards
and increasing political support for banning DDT, the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare established a commission to produce
a report from the National Cancer Institute about DDT. It issued its
report, a careful and thorough review of the science, in 1969.102 It
noted suspicions about DDT, but found there was no firm evidence
that it was carcinogenic to humans. The commission recommended
96. DUNLAP, supra note 14, at 137.
97. GLADWELL, supra note 13, at 50.
98. See infra note 183.
99. Bosso, supra note 20, at 136-137.
100. MANZUR, supra note 19, at 53.
101. Richard D. Cudahy, Coming of Age in .the Environment, 30
ENVTL. L. 15, 16 (2000).
102. U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. and Welfare, Rep. of the Sec'y's
Comm'n on Pesticides and Their Relationship to Envtl. Health
(1969).
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more testing. Environmentalists attacked the report and a wide range
of groups pressed to have DDT banned as a carcinogen. Smelling
victory, EDF sued the USDA and was granted standing to challenge
the propriety of USDA registration of DDT. The federal appeals
court took the opportunity to excoriate the USDA for its clumsy
handling of the matter. 103 Moving quickly by Washington standards,
federal agencies backpedaled and announced that DDT use would be
phased out. 10 4 Perhaps most importantly, Congress shifted responsi-
bility for many aspects of pesticide regulation from the USDA to the
new agency President Richard Nixon had just created by executive
order, the Environmental Protection Agency. The Administrator of
the new agency quickly announced a plan to cancel all of DDT's
registrations in the United States; when several registrants protested,
administrative hearings were scheduled. 105 Despite the recommenda-
tion of the hearing examiner that "essential uses" of DDT be contin-
ued, EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus canceled the registra-
tions, citing environmental concerns.1
06
The 1972 rewrite of FIFRA refocused the statute on safety and en-
vironmental issues, although the basic structure of regulation via
registration remained the same. 10 7 Although the EPA struggled for
decades to reexamine existing registrations under the new criteria,
the EPA moved relatively quickly to ban most of DDT's uses in the
United States. 10 8 The agency also regularly refused petitions for ex-
emptions from the cancellation of DDT's registration over the next
few years. 10 9 Attention in the U.S. then turned to a campaign to end
DDT's manufacture for export."10
103. EDF v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
104. DUNLAP, supra note 14, at 207-11.
105. Toward a Noisier Spring: D.C. Circuit Upholds Cancellation
of DDT Registrations, 4 ENVTL. L. REP. 10013 (1974).
106. Id.
107. ROGERS, supra note 18, at 421-425.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., EPA Denies Request for Emergency Use of DDT in
Louisiana, 5 ENVTL. L. REP. 10065 (1975). DDT was allowed to be
used to stop a tussock moth infestation in the Pacific Northwest in
1974. AARON WILDAVSKY, BUT IS IT TRUE? 58 (1995) [hereinafter
WILDAVSKY].
110. DUNLAP, supra note 14, at 234. See Michael Holley, The
EPA's Pesticide Export Policy: Why The United States Should Re-
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The new rules had an impact on pesticide production and use, as
well as on the introduction of new products. New pesticides tend to
be less toxic, but the increased regulatory costs (in the $50-70 mil-
lion range, with testing and application taking eleven years)"' have
also meant fewer pesticides and those that are developed are aimed
at maj or crop markets. 12
Today the scientific case against DDT is seen as ambiguous; there
is no agreement among scientists that a complete ban was the appro-
priate outcome. 113 Nonetheless, the interests of manufacturers in re-
turning it to use in the United States have long ago vanished along
with their investments in its registration and patent protection for
DDT. New products, for which they had legal protection through the
registration system (raising a barrier to entry for competitors) and the
patent system (blocking copycat products), had replaced the now-
generic DDT.
For our purposes it is not necessary to review all the details of the
struggle over the cancellation of DDT's registration as a pesticide in
the United States. It suffices to note the following features of that
decision. First, the decision was made for the entire nation by the
EPA Administrator. Second, the decision was the subject of a sig-
nificant political battle. Whatever the merits, the decision was
clearly made by appointees of a highly political Administration dur-
ing a period in which the Administration was concerned with the
political impact of environmental policy decisions in positioning
itself for the 1972 presidential elections. 114 Environmental groups
today claim credit for pressuring the EPA into canceling DDT - and
they are correct to do so. Third, many of the complaints about DDT
strict The Export Of Unregistered Pesticides To Developing Coun-
tries, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 340 (2001) (providing a pro-regulatory
account of the campaign).
111. URI, supra note 38, at 68.
112. URI, supra note 38, at 68.
113. See GEORGE M. GRAY & JOHN D. GRAHAM, Regulating Pesti-
cides, in RISK vs. RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND
THE ENVIRONMENT (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds.,
1995) (summarizing debate); WILDAVSKY, supra note 109, at 55-78
(summarizing evidence and concluding ban was not justified).
114. See Andrew P. Morriss, The Politics of the Clean Air Act in
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM 283-284 (Terry L. Anderson ed.,
2001).
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and other pesticides related to their overuse, not their use. This over-
use was, at least in large part, related to state and federal direct and
indirect subsidies for the use of DDT and other pesticides.
E. Summary
To recap briefly what we described above, there have been four
periods of pesticide use and regulation in the United States. In the
pre-modem era, up through the discovery of modem organic pesti-
cides (roughly World War II), pesticides were primarily acutely
toxic inorganic compounds such as lead, the primary problems were
related to pesticides' acute toxicity, and regulation was done by state
and local governments. Pesticides were seen as dangerous but useful
substances and used on a relatively limited numbers of crops.
After the discovery of broad spectrum organic pesticides, such as
DDT and the organophosphates, the United States experienced a
love affair with the chemical control of pests. During this "honey-
moon" period pesticides were popular (use expanded greatly) in part
due to government programs aimed at subsidizing and directly ap-
plying pesticides, and federal regulation began to appear, although it
was often aimed at ensuring state regulators did not hinder the de-
velopment of a national market in pesticides. Acute toxicity concerns
declined, as the new pesticides were far safer than their predecessors.
By the end of the 1950s, however, the honeymoon was over and
conflict over pesticide use began to grow. Organic farmers and
homeowners objected to mandatory government sponsored aerial
spraying of their properties; hunters became concerned about wild-
life losses; and the general public began to fear long-term chronic
environmental harms as they read popular accounts of pesticide
problems in publications like Rachel Carson's best-selling Silent
Spring. Pressure for health and environmental-based regulation of
pesticides began to increase.
Finally, in response to growing concerns, the current regime de-
veloped. Regulation was shifted to the newly-created Environmental
Protection Agency, specific pesticides such as DDT were banned
and new controls introduced on others, and pesticides began to be
viewed primarily as an environmental problem to be controlled.
Meanwhile pesticide use had undergone two parallel develop-
ments. First, governments had used the post-World War II pesticides
in massive campaigns around the world aimed at solving "public
good" problems. These campaigns often failed to respect private
property rights, overriding them in favor of centrally-determined
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definitions of the public welfare and the safety of spraying. Second,
agricultural use of the new chemicals also exploded, spurred in part
by the structure of government farm programs. Unlike the govern-
ment programs, however, agricultural users were liable for harm
they caused others. As described below in section III, those harmed
brought property and tort actions and often recovered damages from
agricultural misuse.
II. THE PROBLEM OF MALARIA CONTROL
Malaria is a significant public health problem today in much of the
developing world."l 5 Other insect-borne diseases are also growing,
including the West Nile virus.16 DDT is a particularly valuable
weapon in the fight against these diseases. The ban on DDT use in
many countries and growing international pressure to end its use and
manufacture worldwide have allowed malaria to make a come-
back. 117 The worry of scientists that there was no good, less toxic,
cost-effective substitute for DDT to control mosquitoes and other
pests is as true today as it was three decades ago.1 18 A disease that
was on the way to being vanquished has returned with a vengeance.
In this section we review the current state of malaria control pro-
grams and the alternatives to DDT use.
115. See ATTARAN, ROBERTS, CURTIS & KILAMA, supra note 1, at
729 (malaria is a "plague that sickens at least 300 million and kills
over one million, mainly children, in economically underdeveloped
areas of the tropics each year").
116. See, e.g., No Spray Coalition, Inc. v. City of New York, 2000
WL 1401458, 1 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
117. See, e.g., Amir Attaran & Rajendra Maharaj, DDTfor Malaria
Control Should Not Be Banned, 321 BMJ (December 2, 2000) (not-
ing that three years after DDT use was stopped, mosquitoes resistant
to the substitute chemical appeared, malaria cases went from 4,117
in 1995 to 27,238 cases in 1999) available at
http://bmj.com/cgi/content/full/321/7273/1403 (last visited Septem-
ber 5, 2002).
118. ATTARAN, ROBERTS, CURTIS & KILAMA, supra note 1, at 729.
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A. Malaria Control
This is not a medical journal article and your authors are not scien-
tists. Nonetheless, we must review a few facts about malaria, malaria
control, and the role of various prevention measures before discuss-
ing the public policy issues.
First, it is important not to underestimate the scope of the malaria
problem. Hundreds of millions suffer from malaria and millions of
families lose infants to malaria - one researcher termed it the equiva-
lent of "filling seven Boeing 747s with children, and then crashing
them, every day."" 9 Besides killing a child every thirty seconds,
malaria harms even those children who survive it. Malaria victims
who survive past infancy "suffer an average of six bouts each year"
making it the most common reason to miss school; adult sufferers
miss an average of ten working days a year.'2 0 Malaria is estimated
to cost six southern African countries alone more than $1,000,000
per year in direct health and productivity costs; malaria-related
losses in economic growth are estimated at more than $100 billion
for Africa since 1965.121
Second, malaria control is mosquito control. The disease is trans-
mitted by parasites through mosquito bites.' 22 Controlling malaria
requires killing mosquitoes before they can transmit the parasite to
humans. Treating malaria requires treatments that kill the parasites;
119. ATTARAN, ROBERTS, CURTIS & KILAMA, supra note 1, at 729.
120. United Nations Children's Fund, Rolling Back Malaria 4
(1999) [hereinafter UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND]; Email
from Martin Villet, Dept. of Zoology & Entomology, Rhodes Uni-
versity, Grahamstown, South Africa Feb. 22, 2000, 18:10:03, Ma-
laria Epidemic in KwaZulu-Natal and DDT: The True Facts (2000)
[hereinafter VILLET]; Malaria Foundation International, available at
www.malaria.org/DDTpage.html (last visited September 5, 2002).
121. Richard Tren and Roger Bate. When Politics Kills: Malaria
and the DDT Story, 39-40 (2001) available at
http://www.fightingmalaria.org/malaria.ps.pdf (last visited on Sept.
5, 2002) [hereinafter TREN & BATE].
122. See Titus Bradley, Malaria and Drug Resistance, at
http://www.micro.msb.le.ac.uk/224/Bradley/History.html (last vis-
ited Sept. 5, 2002) [hereinafter BRADLEY]. A good history of malaria
control from an anti-DDT perspective is in WARGO, supra note 7, at
21-42.
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unfortunately drug resistant strains of malaria are appearing. 123 No
vaccine exists.
Third, environmental pressure groups have succeeded in making
DDT unavailable for malaria control in many countries. The number
of countries using DDT has been whittled down to 23 or fewer.'
24
DDT is produced in only three countries and is becoming difficult to
obtain. The United Nations Environment Program has put it on the
hit list for extinction, seeking a global ban by treaty, 12 while con-
ceding that DDT's usefulness against malaria requires "special atten-
tion and caution."'
' 26
Fourth, the lack of DDT is a significant handicap in malaria con-
trol. Malaria was estimated to infect 350 million people in 1952; the
infection rate had fallen by over 97 percent by 1969 as a result of
DDT having been sprayed inside homes and on mosquito breeding
sites. 127 But "DDT was widely discredited in the 1960s because of
its harmful effects on the environment," so the disease is nearly back
to where it was 50 years ago. 128 In the decades that have passed since
the banning of DDT in the U.S., research on it has continued. While
123. See BRADLEY, supra note 122 ("Drug resistant malaria has
become one of the most important problems in malaria control in
recent years. Resistance in vivo has been reported to all antimalarial
drugs except artemisnin and its derivatives. Drug resistance necessi-
tates the use of drugs which are more expensive and may have dan-
gerous side effects"), available at
http://www.micro.msb.le.ac.uk/224/Bradley/Resistance.html (last
visited Sept. 5, 2002).
124. See supra note 4.
125. United Nations Env't Programme 1 9 th Governing Council
Sess., U.N. Doc. 19/13C (1997) ("international action, including a
global legally binding agreement, is required to reduce the risks to
human health and the environment arising from the release of the
twelve specified persistent organic pollutants [including DDT].")
126. Klaus Topfer, Working Together for a POPs Treaty for the
Next Millennium, Opening Remarks at the Third Session of the In-
tergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Treaty on Persistent
Organic Pollutants (Sept. 6, 1999), available at
http://irptc.unep.ch/pops/POPsnc/INC_3/SpeechTopfer.htm (last
visited Sept. 5, 2002).
127. UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND, supra note 120, at 6.
128. Id.
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we are no more qualified than Rachel Carson to review the details of
scientific studies about chemicals, we will try to offer the gist of the
state of knowledge today. Because some nations still spray DDT to
control mosquitoes, some quit and then resumed spraying, and be-
cause others quit at a certain time, data has been collected from stud-
ies around the world. A review article covering numerous studies in
the British medical journal, The Lancet, provides the basis for this
discussion.1
2 9
When DDT spraying stops, malaria's incidence rises markedly. In
the high and moderate risk regions of Columbia and Peru, for exam-
ple, the risk of malaria doubled when spraying ceased in the
1990s. 130 The disease has returned to areas in which it had been
eradicated: urban areas of the Amazon Basin, Korea, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan. 13 1 In Sri Lanka, malaria cases fell from
2.8 million and 7,300 deaths per year before DDT spraying, to 17
cases and no deaths. When the spraying stopped in 1961, malaria
jumped back to 500,000 cases by 1969,1 2 The spread of the disease
means it has reappeared even in the U.S. and Europe.'
33
DDT is not, of course, the only tool available and the malaria prob-
lem is not being ignored. An international campaign called "Roll
Back Malaria" (RBM) was launched in October 1998 by UNICEF,
WHO, and the World Bank to "prevent and control this centuries-old
scourge. ' 34 Since DDT is unavailable in most nations, and interna-
tional agencies are reluctant to use it even were it is legal, RBM
must rely on other measures: "insecticide-treated mosquito nets,
mosquito coils, repellants and other materials; early detection, con-
tainment and prevention of malaria epidemics; and strengthening of
local capacity to monitor malaria in affected regions."' 35 Monies are
being pieced together from multiple sources for this project that has
a hoped-for budget of $1 billion per year. By early 2000, $27 million
had been collected from or pledged by various countries and interna-
129. D.R. Roberts, S. Manguin & J. Mouchet, DDT House Spray-
ing and Re-emerging Malaria, 356 THE LANCET 330 (2000) [herein-
after ROBERTS, MANGUIN & MOUCHET].
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. ATTARAN, ROBERTS, CURTIS & KILAMA, supra note 1, at 729.
133. ROBERTS, MANGUIN & MOUCHET, supra note 129.
134. UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND, supra note 120, at 1.
135. UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND, supra note 120, at 8.
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tional agencies. 136 While that sum is trivial for the task at hand, the
World Bank has promised to fund up to half the budget. 137 Other
funds are solicited from governments, agencies, NGOs, and the pri-
vate sector, including pharmaceutical companies that can provide
drugs to relieve symptoms as well as, hopefully, invent a cure. The
World Bank is spearheading this private-public partnership called
"New Medicines for Malaria Venture" that is hoped to provide new
medicines at prices affordable for hundreds of millions of impover-
ished persons.'
1 38
Again, the problem is that these measures are simply not as effec-
tive as DDT. Even a UNICEF showcase effort in Laos instituted in
1994 reduced malaria by only 25 percent over three years. 139 The
ambitious goal of the RBM campaign is merely to reduce infant
mortality from the disease (not the incidence) by 50 percent by
2010,140 a far cry from the 97 percent reduction achieved decades
ago with DDT.
One major problem with alternatives is their cost. For example, the
focus of RBM in malaria prevention is on the use of mosquito nets
and a hope that more treatment for sufferers can be developed.
1 4
'
People in the tropical regions of the world are expected to sleep un-
der such nets. At a price of $5 to $10 each, 142 nets are expensive for
people in countries where per capita personal income is measured in
the hundreds of dollars per year. Malaria is common in India and
136. See Roll Back Malaria Partnership, available at
http://mosquito.who.int (last visited March 13, 2003).
137. Donor Responsibilities in Rolling Back Malaria, 356 THE
LANCET 521 (2000).
138. Roll Back Malaria Partnership: Defining the Role of the
World Bank, World Bank Africa Region Findings, No. 144 (Oct.
1999)
139. UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FuND, supra note 120, at 14.
140. UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FuND, supra note 120, at 3.
141. UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FuND, supra note 120, at 2.
142. UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND, supra note 120, at 3.
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Brazil, 143 for example, and per capita incomes in those countries in
2000 were only $450 and $3,580 respectively. 144
Not only are the nets relatively expensive, they also require con-
'tinual retreatment - soaking the nets in insecticide, which must be
done by the nets' owners. 15 As a result, net users experience skin
contact with pesticides, during net retreatment, and through to air
filtered through the insecticide-impregnated nets.
The alternatives also do not appear to work as well as DDT spray
programs. According to an entomologist in South Africa, certain
malaria-carrying species of mosquitoes "are completely resistant to
the new, softer pyrethroid insecticides that were introduced by the
National Department of Health."1 46 While these newer, more costly,
and less effective insecticides may help some, and are believed to be
less toxic to birds than DDT, they have not been subject to as much
study as DDT and so they may pose other environmental problems
yet unknown.
Substituting the nets for DDT use clearly does reduce exposure to
DDT, but increases exposure for many people to malaria-carrying
insects (because the nets are less effective) and to whatever insecti-
cide is used in treating the nets. Substituting other chemicals for
DDT in spray programs subjects individuals in the sprayed areas to
the risks of those other chemicals; it does not eliminate all health
risks. Banning DDT denies these people, who are predominately
poor residents of developing countries, the choice between those
risks and the risks of DDT. In effect, the ban on DDT substitutes
RBM, a more expensive and less effective program with a different
(and not necessarily smaller) set of risks, for the use of DDT. Indeed,
some scientists assert that the insistence of "rich countries" that ma-
laria-infected countries "do without DDT is 'eco-colonialism' that
can impoverish no less than the imperial colonialism of the past
did." 1
47
143. See Titus Bradley, History and Distribution, at http://www-
micro.msb.le.ac.uk/224/Bradley/History.html (last visited Sept. 5,
2002).
144. See World Bank, Data & Statistics, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/data/databytopic/sas-wdi.pdf (last visited
Sept. 5, 2002).
145. UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND, supra note 120, at 3.
146. VILLET, supra note 120.
147. ATTARAN, ROBERTS, CURTIS & KILAMA, supra note 1, at 730.
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As might be expected, in regions where malaria is a scourge, peo-
ple question the viability and morality of RBM when a proven cost-
effective malaria-control product, DDT, already exists. Delegates to
the WHO "Regional Consultation to Prepare African Countries To-
wards Reduction on Reliance on DDT for Malaria Control" in Ha-
rare, Zimbabwe in 2000, for example, issued a statement expressing
the "deep concerns of the participating member states on the possible
economic and health implications of any restriction made on DDT
use for malaria control."' 148 In short, the delegates noted that no cost-
effective or proven alternatives that are less toxic than DDT exist to
replace it. 1
49
DDT effectiveness with regard to eliminating mosquitoes has
never been the main issue. The key questions concern long-term tox-
icity and environmental damage. There are two important facts to
consider in examining those costs. First, the evidence shows that
"toxicity of DDT in human beings and effects on the environment
are questionable and require further investigation" and that "claims
of risks of DDT to human health and the environment have not been
confirmed by replicated scientific inquiry., 50 Further, the evidence
indicates that, when DDT is properly applied, mosquitoes do not
become resistant to DDT, a benefit that is not enjoyed by most alter-
native sprays.' 51 The environmental costs of DDT use are thus far
smaller than was believed in the 1960s and early 1970s, when con-
tinued DDT use was predicted to be leading to an environmental
catastrophe. One indication of this is the public letter signed in 2000
by hundreds of independent scientists, including three Nobel-
laureates in medicine, advocating the use of DDT in malaria con-
trol. 15
2
Second, the means of applying pesticides generally, and DDT in
malaria control in particular, have changed since the 1950s. One rea-
son DDT appeared to be so harmful in the 1950s and 1960s was due
148. Delegates' Report, Regional Consultation To Prepare African
Countries Towards Reduction Of Reliance On DDT For Malaria
Control, Feb. 2000, available at
http://www.malaria.org/ddtreduceaf.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
149. Id.
150. ROBERTS, MANGUIN & MOUCHET, supra note 129, at 330.
151. VILLET, supra note 120.
152. Caution Required with the Precautionary Principle, 356 THE
LANCET 265 (2000).
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to its widespread use in heavy dosages, mostly from government
spray campaigns, but also from overuse by private sprayers who had
not learned proper application techniques. Heavy doses can cause
acute effects in birds, fish, and other wildlife. "The fault for this lies
in the massive agricultural use of DDT. Dusting a single 100-hectare
cotton field, for example, can require more than 1,200 kg of DDT
over 4 weeks."'' 53 Even if DDT is sprayed from the air for mosqui-
toes, the volume and frequency used today is far less than common
agricultural practices of earlier years.' 54 Importantly, however, aerial
spraying for mosquitoes is not needed for DDT to provide signifi-
cant protection to people against mosquitoes:
The current practice is to spray the interior surfaces only of houses
at risk, leaving a residue of DDT at a concentration of 2 g/m2 on the
walls, ceiling and eaves, once or twice a year. Half a kilogram can
treat a large house and protect all its inhabitants. Doubtless some
fraction of this escapes to the outdoors, but even assuming it all did,
the environmental effect is just 0.04% of the effect of spraying a cot-
ton field. Guyana's entire high-risk population for malaria can be
protected with the DDT that might otherwise be sprayed on 0.4 km
2
of cotton in a season.
1 55
153. ATTARAN, ROBERTS, CURTIS & KILAMA, supra note 1, at 729.
154. See generally GLADWELL, supra note 13, at 50.
155. ATTARAN, ROBERTS, CURTIS & KILAMA, supra note 1, at 729.
Indoor spraying works as follows:
"Mosquitoes after biting a human being, with some ex-
ceptions have to rest on the indoor surface, which would
be treated with DDT. DDT may not instantly kill the
mosquitoes but would shorten the life of the mosquitoes
to such an extent, which will not be enough for the sexual
form of malaria parasites in the stomach of the mosqui-
toes to develop into infective asexual forms of parasite.
The long life of DDT on the surface would ensure that
such interruptions of transmission continued for a long
time. No other determinants of malaria transmission were
as potent as the longevity after biting the human being
and no other was so amenable to human actions as this
one."
See also Anil Patel, Forward in TREN AND BATE, supra note 121, at
vii. Indoor spraying was already a crucial part of the antimalaria
campaign by the 1950s. GLADWELL, supra note 13, at 50.
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In sum, malaria is a significant public health problem. Effective
control of malaria is not possible at this time without the use of
DDT. That use imposes far fewer environmental and other costs than
previously thought and has been endorsed by large numbers of pub-
lic health experts. Why, then, is the campaign to ban DDT not only
continuing but succeeding?
B. Green Politics, Dead Children
There is no question that DDT use is opposed by major environ-
mental pressure organizations in the United States and internation-
ally. Greenpeace sponsors protests at the few factories in nations
where DDT is still produced. 156 The World Wildlife Federation is
also pushing to eliminate all use of DDT.'57 "[E]nvironmentalists
are still seeking a global ban, arguing that if DDT is produced for
use in improving public health, it will also be used for agriculture
and lead to global pollution of the environment.0 58 A recent book on
pesticides analogized DDT to nuclear explosions.1
59
Banning the use of an inexpensive, safe solution for a global health
crisis takes more than political organizations opposed to the solution
on ideological grounds, however. The moral argument in favor of
trading lives lost or injured due to malaria to prevent somewhat
speculative environmental harms is, to say the least, challenging to
156. Roger Bate, Without DDT, Malaria Bites Back, SPIKED
SCIENCE (April 24, 2001) available at http://www.spiked-
online.com/Articles/000000005591.htm (last visited September 5,
2002) ("Despite the evidence, Greenpeace militants have been pro-
testing to close down DDT's only major production facility in the
world, in Cochin, India.")
157. TREN& BATE, supra note 121.
158. D.R. Roberts, S. Manguin & J. Mouchet, DDT House Spray-
ing andRe-emerging Malaria, 356 THE LANCET 330, 331 (2000).
159. See WARGO, supra note 7, at 299 (concluding that
"[p]hotographs of children frolicking in mists of DDT" and "of sail-
ors shielding their eyes from nearby aboveground atomic bomb ex-
plosions in the South Pacific at mid-century" show comparable prob-
lems: "[b]oth technologies caused global contamination of the food
supply, placing every human at risk...").
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articulate. 160 There are a number of interest groups that benefit from
restricting or eliminating DDT use.
First on the list are the manufacturers of substitute pesticides. Re-
call that other chemicals present two problems: they are more expen-
sive and often more toxic. Alternatives costs two to four times as
much as DDT.161 That higher cost, an entomologist at the EPA as-
serts, is likely to lead many countries to abandon house spraying
altogether. 1 62
In any event, chemical companies are no doubt pleased to supply
more costly and less effective chemicals in lieu of cheap, generic
DDT. The "insistence of environmental advocacy seems to have won
approval of powerful pesticide companies because it allows them to
sell their more expensive insecticides. The replacement of DDT by
organophosphate, carbamate, or pyrethroid insecticides is commonly
proposed even though price, efficacy, duration or effectiveness, and
160. See, e.g., Christopher H. Schroeder, Rights Against Risks, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 495, 517-518 (1986) (describing and critiquing pro-
ban position as putting "far too much weight on the distinction be-
tween actions and nonactions."). Those authors who claim a moral
justification for imposing American attitudes on other nations often
simply fail to acknowledge that pesticides like DDT could have le-
gitimate uses in developing nations. See, e.g., Michael Holley, The
EPA 's Pesticide Export Policy: Why the United States Should Re-
strict the Export of Unregistered Pesticides to Developing Countries,
9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 340, 341 (2001) (ignoring the malaria issue
entirely and stating simply that "it is commonly understood that de-
veloping countries are allowing the import of unregistered pesticides
only because they, unlike the developed countries that produce those
pesticides, lack a regulatory infrastructure that would allow them to
make sound risk/benefit analyses regarding the use of such prod-
ucts").
161. Roger Thurow, In Malaria War, South Africa Turns to Pesti-
cide Long Banned in the West, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2001, at Al
(noting DDT costs about one cent per square yard of coverage com-
pared to almost two cents per square yard for cheapest alternative
and about four cents per square yard for carbamates.); ATTARAN,
ROBERTS, CURTIS & KILAMA, supra note 1, at 730.
162. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, DDT, Target of Global Ban, Finds De-
fenders in Experts on Malaria, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 29, 1999, at Al.
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side-effects (e.g. an unpleasant smell), are major barriers to use in
poor countries
' 163
Second, international aid organizations, such as the World Bank,
UNICEF, WHO and other international government agencies, have
reasons to prefer complex and less effective programs like RBM to
DDT use. One reason is that these organizations are simply not
needed in the area of malaria control without a DDT ban. DDT is
cheap and simple. Without DDT, malaria is a global tragedy that
easily justifies a billion-dollar-a-year budget for RBM, a program
likely to become a permanent feature so long as DDT is outlawed.
The plague will never go away and so the control programs will be
permanent. The problem may be made smaller and less tragic, but a
permanent program will only put a dent in a persistent problem that
was near extinction three decades ago. Note that such incentives can
affect agency behavior even if the officials in the agency are not
consciously pursuing such a strategy.
Not only does the permanent existence of a program benefit the
bureaucrats who work for the program, organizations like the World
Bank benefit from participation in these programs, in that programs
like RBM help burnish the organizations' environmental credentials.
RBM will have only limited success, even if it meets its goals. Sur-
prisingly, this does not irritate environmental organizations, who
indeed applaud the use of mosquito nets rather than DDT. The
World Bank, for example, is routinely blasted (with good reason) by
environmentalists for supporting 9rograms that are environmentally
(and economically) destructive. RBM gives the Bank a public
health role that is hard to criticize, one with a plausible impact on
economic development (sick people cannot work as well as healthy
people). This helps the World Bank make peace with its environ-
mental critics, yet justify its continued existence for years to
come. 1
65
163. ROBERTS, MANGUIN, & MOUCHET, supra note 129, at 331.
164. See Matthew Brown, Banking on Disaster: The World Bank
and Environmental Destruction in GOVERNMENT VERSUS THE
ENVIRONMENT (Donald R. Leal & Roger E. Meiners eds., 2001.
165. The World Bank is not alone among agencies that have
changed their agenda. As Terry Anderson and others have docu-
mented in The Greening of Foreign Policy, a host of federal agencies
have, with the waning of the cold war in particular, turned into agen-
cies with environmental agendas or, at least, agendas that will not
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Third, because the alternatives to DDT are so ineffective, the long
term focus must be on developing a vaccine. While there is nothing
on the immediate horizon, drug companies and other researchers are
happy to accept funds from government agencies to work on the pro-
ject, creating another group with a vested interest in continuing the
status quo.
Fourth, the major environmental pressure groups have important
interests in fighting a return of DDT. The initial ban on DDT re-
mains an important symbolic victory for environmental pressure
groups. The fight over DDT was bitter' 66 and a major triumph for the
new environmental movement. Indeed, the Environmental Defense
Fund, one of the most effective groups, grew out of the initial cam-
paign against DDT spraying on Long Island 167 and continues to
highlight its role in the DDT ban in fund-raising appeals to this day.
Conceding that they were wrong on DDT would cause the groups to
lose an important fundraising and public relations symbol. On the
offend the politically potent environmental organizations. To survive
without old enemies to fight, they need new friends. See The Green-
ing of U.S. Foreign Policy (Terry L. Anderson & Henry I. Miller
eds., 2000).
166. Just one example of how bitter is revealed in Edwards v. Nat'l
Audubon Soc'y, 423 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd, 566 F.2d
113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1002 (1977). As part of the na-
tional debate, the proponents of DDT argued that the Society's an-
nual bird count showed increasing bird populations. Robert S. Arbib,
Jr., an editor of the Count, claimed that this misrepresented the
Count, since the increase in birds was due to more people participat-
ing in the Count. Anyone who asserted otherwise, he said, was "be-
ing paid to lie." A New York Times reporter then asked Arbib for the
names of the "paid liars" and Arbib gave him a list of five scientists.
After the Times reported on the allegation that the scientists were
lying, three sued the Audubon Society and the Times for defamation.
Although they won at trial, the verdict was reversed on appeal. Id.
167. See Environmental Defense, About Environmental Defense, at
http://www.environmentaldefense.org/aboutus.cfm?subnav=aboutus
(last visited September 5, 2002) ("A generation ago, Environmental
Defense helped launch the modern environmental movement by
winning a ban on the pesticide DDT, thus showing how a handful of
individuals can use science and the law to bring about national re-
form.").
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other hand, environmental groups face no responsibility for the con-
sequence of millions of babies dying and hundreds of millions suf-
fering. The cost of their position is born overseas, among poor coun-
tries where they have few, if any, members and by people their
members are unlikely to meet.'
68
Finally, malaria (or at least malaria in poor developing countries)
is apparently not interesting enough to attract media attention in the
United States. For example, while we hear much in the media about
AIDS in Africa, we hear much less about the malaria epidemic. 1
69
C. Summary
Malaria and other insect-borne diseases are susceptible to control
through a cheap and effective means. That control strategy requires
the use of DDT, a chemical with potent symbolic importance to do-
mestic American political pressure groups. As a result, the United
States has acquiesced in the elimination of this strategy, resulting in
millions of additional cases of malaria and deaths.
III. PESTICIDES & COMMON LAW ENVIRONMENTALISM
As Dr. Murphy argued to the federal courts in his original suit
against spraying on Long Island, nonconsensual spraying is trespass.
Property owners had a common law right not to have their property
invaded by a substance they believed to be damaging to the vegeta-
tion and wildlife on the property. If upheld, Murphy's theory would
have prevented much of the overuse of pesticides in the mass spray-
ing programs promoted by the USDA and other agencies during the
1950s and 1960s. (Of course, individual landowners could have mis-
used DDT or other chemicals on their own land.) And, in many
168. See Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary
Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 851, 890-91 (1996) ("[T]he
United States has been fortunate to feel few of the foregone health
benefits from DDT use, but the worldwide impact was immense.").
169. For example, a search in the ALLNEWS database on Westlaw
turned up more than 10,000 hits (the maximum number Westlaw
will display) for stories on "Africa /s AIDS" after January 1, 2001
but only 1336 for "Africa /s malaria" for the same period. Using the
period after January 1, 2002 searches found 4,966 and 507, respec-
tively.
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cases, courts relied on common law property and tort theories to or-
der compensation for unwanted pesticide spraying by private indi-
viduals, primarily in cases where chemicals applied to one land-
owner's property drifted across the border and caused harm to a
neighbor's land. In this section we explore how the courts dealt with
pesticide cases between private parties and offer an explanation of
why the theories failed to adequately handle the larger problems to-
gether with a remedy that would enable them to do so. We then ex-
amine the difference between centralized and decentralized decision
making, concluding that decentralized decision making offers a su-
perior means of handling pesticide issues.
A. Pesticides in the Courts
The fact that individuals are responsible to pay damages for spray-
ing pesticides carelessly, and inflicting injury on the property of an-
other, has long been the rule of law: "common law tort theories im-
posing liability for crop, livestock and personal damages on those
responsible for creating the pesticide drift should be understood as
social efforts to internalize those external costs by making the pol-
luter pay."' 7
0
Cases from the 1950s concerning agricultural spraying of pesti-
cides show that the general rule was that a farmer and a sprayer he or
she hired could be held liable for spray that was accidentally dumped
on a neighbor's property or drifted on to a neighbor's property and
did damage to crops, livestock, or persons. 17 No bad intention
needed to be proven, and usually did not exist. 172 Drift was usually
the result of attempts to save on effort and manpower in reducing the
precision of application or failing to wait for wind conditions to be
optimal, not the result of a desire to waste money by dumping spray
on the property of another or distributing the pesticide under windy
conditions. Quite a number of cases concern spray that drifted and
170. Robert F. Blomquist, Applying Pesticides: Toward Reconcep-
tualizing Liability to Neighbors for Crop, Livestock and Personal
Damages from Agricultural Chemical Drift, 48 OKLA. L. REv. 393,
397 (1995).
171. See, e.g., Crouse v. Wilbur-Ellis Co., 272 P.2d 352 (Ariz.
1954).
172. See, e.g., Faire v. Burke, 252 S.W.2d 289 (Mo. 1952).
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killed bees. In such cases, liability was regularly imposed. 173 Other
cases concerned spray that caused dairy milk to be contaminated
with unacceptable levels of pesticide. 174 If one was careless and
sprayed too much because directions from the manufacturer were not
followed the action rose to the level of negligence per se. 175 Con-
trary to what happened to the organic growers on Long Island whose
crops were sprayed with DDT, farmers have won cases for having
their crops damaged by pesticide sprays from neighboring farmers
that made them ineligible for "organic" certification, even though the
level of pesticides on the crops was within federal standards for hu-
man consumption.176
Courts have upheld a variety of theories applied to pesticide drift
cases. Some states have allowed strict liability claims, applying the
maxim that "one must use his own rights as not to infringe upon the
rights of another."' 77 Courts have also relied on the determination
that aerial application of pesticides is an abnormally dangerous ac-
tivity to justify strict liability.178 Manufacturers of pesticides have
also been held liable for drift damage on strict liability rounds.1
79
Other theories successfully used have included nuisance 1F° and tres-
pass. 181 The predominant theory, however, has been negligence.1
8 2
173. See, e.g., Lundberg v. Bolon, 194 P.2d 454 (Ariz. 1948).
174. See, e.g., Smith v. Okerson, 73 A.2d 857 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1950).
175. See, e.g., Bennett v. Larsen, 348 N.W.2d 540 (Wis. 1984).
176. See, e.g., Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 567 P.2d 218 (Wash.
1977).
177. Young v. Darter, 363 P.2d 829, 832 (Okla. 1961). See also
Gotreaux v. Gary, 94 So.2d 293 (La. 1957) (applying maxim "sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas" or that property owners have a right
to improve their land but may not do so in a manner that infringes on
the rights of others).
178. See, e.g., Langan, 567 P.2d at 221.
179. See, e.g., Chapman Chem. Co. v. Taylor, 222 S.W.2d 820, 827
(Ark. 1949).
180. See, e.g., Gainey v. Folkman, 114 F. Supp. 238 (D. Ariz.
1953).
181. See, e.g., Alm v. Johnson, 275 P.2d 959 (Idaho 1954).
182. See, e.g., S.A. Gerrard Co. v. Fricker, 27 P.2d 678, 680 (Ariz.
1933); Hammond Ranch Corp. v. Dodson, 136 S.W.2d 484, 487
(Ark. 1940); McKennon v. Jones, 244 S.W.2d 138,140 (Ark. 1951);
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Given the success in using common law theories, both before and
after the DDT debate, why were the Long Island plaintiffs unable to
use them to block the DDT spraying? 183 The answer is simple: The
plaintiffs sought to restrain the government, not private parties. The
plaintiffs could have won injunctive relief against a private party
who chartered a plane and sprayed even a harmless substance on the
plaintiffs' land. But compared to the "public interest," as articulated
by the federal government, the plaintiffs could not hope to prevail
without more dramatic harm. Since federal programs generally over-
ride property rights and common law protections, the battle over pes-
ticides had to be played out in the public and political arena. Gov-
ernment agencies also avoided liability in this period for conduct for
which nongovernmental entities would be held liable under the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity.'84
The common law failed in addressing the DDT spraying because it
was never given a chance to be applied. As a result, the debate about
DDT has been an all or nothing debate. In the next section we com-
Kennedy v. Clayton, 227 S.W.2d 934 (Ark. 1950); Heeb v. Prysock,
245 S.W.2d 577 (Ark. 1952).
183. The same issue arose again in state court in New York in
1967. This time, the newly formed Environmental Defense Fund
(EDF), which was formed that year largely due to the DDT issue,
was behind a suit to try to enjoin spraying government spraying of
DDT to control mosquitos on Long Island. DUNLAP, supra note 14,
at 142-200 discusses this history. Perhaps being more savvy politi-
cally, the plaintiff did not argue on the basis of trespass or takings,
but proposed a theory that they had the right to enjoin actions that
adversely affects natural resources. Yannacone v. Dennison, 285
N.Y.S.2d 476 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1967). That novel argument had no basis
in common law or statutory law, so no injunction was issued, but
plaintiffs were well aware that the issue was moving to the political
level, so impact on the media may have the most real purpose of this
and similar suits brought by the new organization. Coverage of such
litigation added to the drum beat against DDT that was very public
after publication of Silent Spring in 1962. The product was not long
for the market.
184. See, e.g., Neff. v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 299 P.2d 359 (Cal.
App. 1956); Rabin v. Lakeworth Drainage Dist., 82 So. 2d 353 (Fla.
1955).
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pare the decision making apparatus of the common law with that of
centralized regulation schemes.
The importance of the government spraying programs in sparking
the debate over DDT is now largely ignored. For example, one of the
major opponents of DDT use in the Senate, Wisconsin Senator Gay-
lord Nelson, recalled in a 1995 interview how he developed his op-
position to DDT:
"DDT was very popular in most of the cities, including
wealthy suburbs. The governor's residence was in the
rich suburb of Maple Bluff on Lake Mendota, looking
across the lake to the capital. Big trucks would go around
and fog the whole area with DDT. Well, you didn't have
to be a scientist to recognize that this was goofy. They
were killing mosquitoes, but it was a potent agent affect-
ing birds and every other insect -valuable insects, worms,
everything. I just felt that was a crazy idea. In any event,
by the time I was elected to the U.S. Senate and came to
Washington in 1963, I had read Rachel Carson's book,
Silent Spring. Then I introduced the first legislation in the
Senate to ban the use of DDT."' 85
Note what Nelson does not say. He does not say that he took action
to stop the government's overspraying. Rather, the government's
overspray motivated him to work to prevent anyone from using
DDT.
Similarly, the history of DDT's use has been ignored in the aca-
demic literature. For example, Prof. Terry Frazier summarized this
experience with DDT as follows:
"Adapting old rules to fit new conflicts also means that
we must be prepared to rethink and amend some rules as
our scientific understanding of cause and effect relation-
ships involving resource consumption grows. For exam-
ple, consider the history of our society's use of DDT as a
pesticide. Use of DDT in the South Pacific during World
War II saved countless lives that otherwise would have
been lost to malaria. Postwar use of DDT led to greater
agricultural production and relatively pest-free urban
comforts. Yet scientific study of the cumulative public
health affects of DDT use revealed a potential human and
185. Milo Mason, Interview: Gaylord Nelson, NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T 72, 73-74 (1995).
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ecological disaster by the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Property owners who were free to use DDT to control
pests on their land in the early 1960s no longer could use
the chemical in its pure form by the early 1970s. One of
the most important lessons of our experience with DDT
should be that our property rules must leave room to
adapt to changes in what we know about the web of eco-
logical relationships that bind us to every other compo-
nent of our environment."' 
86
A reader of Frazier's account would think that the government's role
in the saga was entirely a protector of the common good, while pri-
vate property owners sprayed their land indiscriminately. In fact, as
we have shown above, precisely the opposite was the case with DDT
- private property owners objected to government spraying pro-
grams, not the reverse.
Of course, one objection to the use of DDT was that it bioaccumu-
lated in the environment.' 87 Could markets and the courts have ad-
dressed this issue through market forces and the common law? We
believe so for three reasons. First, bioaccumulation is greatly in-
creased by inefficient delivery mechanisms, such as aerial spraying,
where much of the active ingredient does not reach the target pest.
Such methods are also the most likely to produce immediate external
effects, such as drift, since methods that deliver more of the active
ingredient to pests are less likely to accidentally deliver active ingre-
dient to non-target species. The common law doctrines of negli-
gence, trespass, and strict liability thus provide an incentive to avoid
inefficiencies in delivery, as does the cost of the product. They
would therefore tend to reduce the opportunities for bioaccumula-
tion.
186. Terry W. Frazier, Protecting Ecological Integrity Within the
Balancing Function of Property Law, 28 ENVTL. L. 53, 99-100
(1998).
187. See, e.g, WWF Press Release, Three Decades After Silent
Spring, DDT Still Menacing the Environment (June 30, 1998) at
http://www.panda.org/news/press/archive/news_219.htm (last vis-
ited September 5, 2002) ("Because DDT can travel long distances
and accumulate in the body, millions of humans and animals world-
wide have buildups of the chemical in their tissue, even though it
may have been produced on another continent").
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Second, the early modem pesticides such as DDT were extremely
broad spectrum pesticides. As a result, these chemicals affected a
wide range of species. Succeeding generations of pesticides have
been more narrowly targeted to specific pests, reducing the risk of
bioaccumulation and reducing the risk of common law liability (e.g.
for killing bees). In the absence of product market regulation that
slows innovation, as the pesticide registration system does by ex-
tending existing products' market life by restricting the entry of
competitors, the effect of competitive product markets would likely
have produced a shift toward less harmful products even without a
specific market demand for such products. Combined with a demand
for "safe" and "environmentally friendly" products, which can be
found in stores today, the shift would have occurred even faster.
Third, in the absence of government incentives, both direct and in-
direct, for pesticide use (such as government-funded spray programs
and farm price supports), pesticide use would be substantially less,
further reducing the problem of the long-term presence of pesticides
in the environment. Moreover, had governments been required to
pay for the damage they caused, government spray campaigns would
have been conducted differently and less frequently.
Would these factors have completely dealt with every instance of
harm caused by pesticides to either the environment or individuals?
Of course not. We argue merely that they would have dealt with
these harms better than the alternative of centrally-directed spraying
and chemical use promotion succeeded by attempts to restrict the use
of chemicals for reasons we discuss below.
B. Centralization vs. Decentralization
Pesticide regulation today in the United States is a paradigm case
of central planning. Each product must be registered with the EPA,
and registration decisions are supposed to give government experts
the opportunity to examine the labels, application procedures, side-
effects, environmental impacts, and human health effects of the
products. Only those that meet the regulator's criteria for striking the
proper balance are allowed to be sold. Moreover, federal, state, and
local governments regularly make decisions about when to apply
pesticides, just as they did in the more extensive spraying operations
of the 1950s and 1960s.
These decisions both have the most important characteristic of de-
cisions made through the political process: the winner takes all. Ei-
ther a product is allowed or it is not. Either we all get sprayed
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through government spraying problems or no one gets sprayed. Ei-
ther we all pay, via our taxes, for spraying or no one may pay. That
tends to be the nature of political decisions - winners get more than
what they are willing to pay for; losers are denied what they prefer
and must contribute to fund the other side.
Markets and the common law, on the other hand, generally make
decisions at the margin: Farmer Jones decides if it is worth buying
some spray, and, if so, how much will work for her. If Farmer Jones
sprays, some molecules of spray may drift on to her neighbor's
property; if she sprays too much, it will rise to the level of actionable
damage and she will pay for her carelessness in violating her obliga-
tion to protect her neighbor from her actions. Markets provide an
incentive to conserve on inputs. Massive aerial spraying of pesticides
for mosquito control has given way to more sophisticated, and
cheaper, delivery mechanisms such as the use of house-spraying de-
scribed earlier in part because the latter is cheaper.
Consider three key distinctions between market and common law
decisions and centralized regulatory decisions:
* Regulators depend on centralized collection and proc-
essing of knowledge, inevitably losing the benefits of lo-
cal knowledge. Markets and case-by-case adjudication
enable decision makers to rely on local knowledge.
9 Markets and the common law make local mistakes;
regulators make mistakes on a grander scale, sometimes
even national or global mistakes.
* Regulators make decisions influenced by political fac-
tors; juries and individuals in markets make decisions
based on specific circumstances, general principles, and
self-interest. 1
8 8
Each of these comes into play in the malaria debacle. Regulators in
the United States are in a poor position to evaluate the conditions in
malaria-ridden areas of other nations that might justify DDT's use.
188. For a more detailed discussion of the differences between cen-
tral planning and markets and common law, see Andrew P. Morriss
& Roger E. Meiners, The Destructive Role of Land Use Planning, 14
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 95, 109 (2000); and Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce
Yandle, & Terry L. Anderson, Principles for Water, 15 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 335; and Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law
and the Conceit of Modern Environmental Policy, 7 GEO. MASON L.
REv. 923 (1999).
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Yet American regulators are pressing to extend their ban on DDT to
the entire world in response to political pressure from domestic envi-
ronmental interest groups.
C. Protecting Public Health Under the Common Law
Some readers may be a bit nervous at this point. "We agree with
the need to use every available tool to fight public health hazards
like malaria," readers may think, "but wouldn't those programs be
immediately tied up with lawsuits by people asserting property rights
to block spraying on exactly the grounds you suggest?" And, indeed,
there are lawsuits underway in attempts to block public health re-
lated spraying programs against mosquitoes potentially carrying the
West Nile virus (not using DDT) in the United States today. How
can the common law handle such cases without endangering the pub-
lic health?
Three things make us believe that the common law could strike the
proper balance in such cases, or at least get a great deal closer than
the administrative-statutory central-planning methods we currently
rely upon. First, courts faced with a suit by a property holder seeking
to block a public health related spray campaign, whether today or on
Long Island in the 1950s, have three choices: (1) enjoin the spraying
program; (2) permit the spraying program, but award the plaintiff
damages; and (3) permit the spray program without awarding dam-
ages. If a public health emergency exists, the second option is con-
sistent with both the protection of the public health and private prop-
erty rights.
Second, putting government spraying programs "on budget" by re-
quiring them to pay for the property they damage will force authori-
ties to balance the costs and benefits of their actions differently than
if they are able to take property without compensation. 89 The prob-
lems with the pest eradication programs we described earlier was
that they were only marginally beneficial even under the assump-
tions that the pesticides used were not environmentally harmful.
(Recall that southern farmers had to be given the chemicals to use
against the fire ants to induce their participation.) Such programs
189. This is essentially the argument Richard Epstein makes con-
cerning how the takings doctrine sorts government actions generally
into welfare-enhancing and rent-seeking. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS (1989).
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would be unlikely to survive the costs of compensating property
owners.
Third, many of the problems of pesticide use generally and of
DDT use in particular are related to their application in relatively
indiscriminate fashion. The fire ant and gypsy moth programs, for
example, sprayed tens of thousands of acres. A requirement that the
programs compensate wronged property owners would create an
incentive to minimize compensation costs by choosing less indis-
criminate application methods. Ground spraying of infested spots
could be substituted for aerial spraying of entire counties, for exam-
ple.
A second problem remains, however. All of the above relate to
solving acute toxicity problems related to pesticide use, not chronic
problems. Particularly in the case of bioaccumulation of pesticides
and their derivatives, how can the common law cope? We argued
earlier that there are reasons to expect that pesticides would have
evolved toward less-environmentally destructive alternatives in the
absence of regulation. Even without such evolution, however, it is
important to remember that bioaccumulation can be addressed in
multiple ways. For example, there are multiple successful instances
of wildlife groups compensating farmers and ranchers to increase
desirable wildlife habitat.19° Farmers paid to create habitat can also
be paid to use less-destructive means of pest-control. To the extent
that existing common law protections are insufficient to protect
some environmental values, this may be addressed by expanding
property institutions.1 91 Ownership of threatened species can be in-
stituted (e.g. title to eagles threatened by DDT bioaccumulation
could have been awarded to Native American tribes that revere the
eagles, thus creating a rights holder to seek a remedy if the species
were threatened.) 192
190. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Waterfowl, and the
Menace of Mr. Wilson: Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and the
Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation, 29 ENVTL. L. 1, 54-62 (1999)
(describing private efforts).
191. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits,
Standing, and Environmental Protection, 12 DuKE ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y F. 39 (2001).
192. We thank Jonathan Adler for suggesting to us that a problem
in using the common law to protect birds is that wild bird species are
50 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LA WJOURNAL
D. Summary
The problems caused by DDT and other pesticides' use were, we
contend, significantly related to the government's decision to engage
in massive pesticide use, indirectly encouraging pesticide use
through agricultural and other programs, and refusing to respect the
rights of property-owners who objected. By comparison, pesticide
problems between private individuals have long been successfully
dealt with by the courts using common law tort and property doc-
trines. By relying on centralized command-and-control regulatory
schemes, the demand for which grew out of government misbehav-
ior, regulators have changed decentralized decisions on the margin
into all-or-nothing political decisions. The result is the denial of ef-
fective means of combating malaria in poor nations around the world
and the deaths and immiseration of millions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Why do we favor bugs over kids by preventing the use of DDT to
save millions of lives each year? Is it that the lives saved would be
primarily those of people of color in developing nations? That those
whose lives saved would be among the world's poorest? Is the rising
death toll the result of racism? Of the indifference of multinational
capitalists to the plight of the poor? Of ignorance of the solution to
their problems? Of capitalist greed? None of these explain the prob-
lem. The refusal to use DDT to save lives in Africa, Asia, the Pacific
Islands, Latin America and everywhere malaria and other insect-
borne diseases plague humanity is due to the indifference of envi-
ronmental pressure groups who elsewhere loudly tout their commit-
ment to environmental justice for the poor and their opposition on
environmental grounds to economic activity and international trade.
It is also unnecessary.
The saga of DDT, now a half-century long, is the result of moving
decision making from the private sector to government. It was public
decision makers, spending other people's money and responding to
special interest pressures, that sprayed DDT and other chemicals
over millions of acres, all in the name of the public good, exercising
related to the lack of property rights in the birds and could be poten-
tially solved by creating such rights.
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the "police power," as the courts that reviewed the spray policy said.
Residents of Long Island who objected to their property being
sprayed with DDT saw the consequences of central decision-making.
The birds killed by overspraying experienced it directly. Today it is
public decision makers, spending other people's money, deciding
that DDT may not be used and that other, less effective and more
costly, measures will be taken instead. Residents of many villages in
many nations who might wish to use DDT in their own homes to
save their children also see the consequences of central decision
making.
We posit that, except for the spraying of soldiers in World War II,
the government had little justification for spraying DDT (and other
pesticides) here and there. It was a violation of property rights.
Where a public health rationale exists, spraying programs should
compensate those whose property they damage. We agree with Dr.
Murphy and the original plaintiffs who sued the USDA in 1957, con-
tending that the spray program was a trespass on their property and
deprived them of the full value of their property without compensa-
tion. Those who preferred to have pesticide-free crops may have
been "irrational" in their preferences, in that there was no scientific
basis for their concerns about human health impacts from trace lev-
els of DDT, but there was no reason they should not have been able
to enjoy such a preference on their own property. They asked for no
forced subsidy from taxpayers; they merely asked to be left alone on
their property and for their preferences to be respected.
Public decision makers have little reason to respect personal pref-
erences to use or not use DDT on an individual's property because it
weakens the latitude of the legislature and the agencies that execute
its wishes. As an Assistant Secretary of Agriculture told Congress,
with respect to the fire ant spray program, "all infestations must be
treated without regard to location, land use, or ownership."' 93 That
is, property rights cannot be considered when the wisdom of public
decision makers is expressed. As one critic noted about the spray
program, it is "a monument to the power which key congressmen on
strategic committees can exercise over environmental policy."' 194 The
fire ant spray program drew the same kind of reaction among some
farmers in the South that the DDT spray program drew in New York.
As the USDA began to back down it admitted that "areas have been
193. Bosso, supra note 20, at 87.
194. Bosso, supra note 20, at 86.
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aerially treated contrary to the wishes of property owners."'1 95 Not
everyone agrees with "public health" measures or even programs
specifically designed to help a specific interest group, such as farm-
ers whose land contains fire ants. Those who did not like the pro-
grams, having no legal protection, had to turn to political action, and
the creation of groups such as the Environmental Defense Fund, to
try get their way. Suppose the courts had held, in the early chal-
lenges to the DDT spraying, that such spraying was a trespass or a
taking without compensation. What would the result have been? The
bald eagle may have not suffered such large population drops that
the eagles needed the protection of the Endangered Species List.
Millions of lives would have been saved from malaria.
Political action, not markets and the rule of law, tends to dictate
one solution for all. If you are on the winning side, you get to have
your preferences forced on others and make them help pay for what
you want. If you are on the losing side, you may not exercise your
preferences and you are forced to pay for what the winning coalition
wants.
Since the early 1970s the winning coalition has been the opposite
of what dominated the previous two decades. Opponents of pesti-
cides have the upper hand politically and rather than force people to
have their property sprayed with DDT or some other pesticide, they
have gotten political actors and government agencies to act on behalf
of their preferences by prohibiting anyone from using DDT on their
own property to protect themselves from mosquitoes and the deadly
diseases they carry. To prevent a largely theoretical risk' 96 to birds,
humans suffer and die; the cause is the same • public decision mak-
ers running roughshod over the rights of citizens to protect their per-
sons and their property in the way they most see fit.
Clearly, under the common law, one would be free to spray the in-
side of one's own house to reduce the risk of a deadly disease, and
the evidence suggests that it would not inflict injury on a neighbor's
property. Yet that level of personal protection, one that could be life-
saving, is now prohibited because of command-and-control rules that
dictate minuscule details of the use of one's own property, even if no
harm is done to anyone. Such decisions are too important to be left
to politicians.
195. Bosso, supra note 20, at 102.
196. The risk from house spraying, for example, is minimal.
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But perhaps the groups that champion the banning of DDT are
chagrined to have the issue discussed. Trading a million lives every
year, and immeasurable human misery, on the basis of limited evi-
dence from the 1960s that DDT might have caused egg shell thin-
ning for some birds subjected to massive government spraying may
strike many people as harsh. But even this understates the problem
caused by central planning approaches. To pose the problem as a
tradeoff between millions of lives sacrificed in poor nations because
wealthy residents of Western nations are worried about bird popula-
tions is to answer the question. If indeed the risk of DDT is such that
it could lead to silent springs, then billions should be spent on alter-
native malaria eradication, prevention, and treatment techniques. But
as the RBM program indicates, present technology suggests only
modest improvements in fighting malaria are likely. Yet neither of
these tradeoffs is necessary. Under a decentralized property rights
approach to environmental problems, pesticide issues need not be a
choice between babies and birds but rather allow us to have both.

